Abstract: US states are active in enacting immigration policies, which vary widely and have substantial impact on the lives of immigrants. Our understanding of what produces these divergent state laws remains limited. Qualitative research demonstrates the importance of a 2010 immigration compact, supported by a powerful religious organization, in shaping immigration policies in Utah, and the Utah Compact was held up as a model for other states. But is the experience of Utah applicable across other states? We test the effects of compacts and interest groups on immigration policy adoption across all 50 states between 2005 and 2013. Our findings suggest that compacts are actually associated with more restrictive immigration policy. Although states with compacts are more likely to pass inclusive immigration laws, these are counterbalanced by higher numbers of exclusive laws. Both religious and non-religious interests groups are associated with policy, but they do not explain the effects of compacts.
Introduction
Between 2010 and 2013, immigration compacts were adopted in nine US states. During a period of federal deadlock and increasing state-level policy activity in the area of immigration, immigration compacts were seen as a potential model for states, and possibly for the US as a whole, to follow (New York Times 2010; Canham 2013) . The first of these state immigration compacts, singed in November 2010, was the Utah Compact-a statement of five principles meant to guide the discussion of immigration policy in Utah (Utah . The Utah
Compact served as a model for the nine immigration compacts that followed.
Some evidence indicates that the Utah Compact was a successful driver of immigration policy in the state. A few months after the Compact was signed, the Utah legislature passed a suite of primarily pro-immigration laws known as the "Utah solution", reversing a strong trend of anti-immigrant legislation that began in 2008 (Stewart and Jameson 2013) . Subsequent research has argued that the Compact itself had a strong impact on this policy reversal (authors 2016) . The effectiveness of the Utah Compact was facilitated by the support of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church) (authors 2016) . Although the LDS Church plays a uniquely dominant role in Utah, across the US there has been an increase in the "chorus of religious voices in favor of liberal immigration reform" in recent years (Nteta and Wallsten 2012:891) . In addition, other interest groups such as agriculture and construction industry lobbies have pushed for inclusive immigration policies. Taken together, the role of religious organizations, other interest groups, and state compacts could be important drivers of state-level immigration policy, but as yet we know little about the role of compacts outside the state of Utah.
In this paper, we attempt to address this limitation by modeling the effects of state immigration compacts and the prevalence of different interest groups on migration policy adoption across all 50 states between 2005 and 2013 (the last year in which any state adopted an immigration compact). State-level immigration policies have clear impacts on the lives of immigrants living in those states. When states pass inclusive laws, immigrants experience better relations and greater trust with the local police, better healthcare outcomes, utilization, and access, and greater access to labor markets (Ayon et al. 2012; Bozick and Miller 2013; Dreby 2012; 2015; Flores 2010; Kirk et al. 2012; Toomey et al. 2014; White et al. 2014 ). When they pass exclusive laws, immigrants experience worse health outcomes and decreased rates of high school enrollment, among many other issues (Adroff et al. 2011; Arbona et al. 2012; Bozick and Miller 2013; Flores 2010; Steel et al. 2011) . Given the importance and diversity of state immigration policies, there is a growing literature on the drivers of these policies. Despite this growing literature, the "politics of state immigrant policy making are not well understood" (Turner and Sharry 2012:985) .
Theories and Research on State Immigration Policies
Sociologists have long noted that the field of immigration studies provides little theoretical understanding for the process of immigration policy-making (Portes 1997) . Still, attempts have been made to understand immigration policy starting with Freeman's "modes of immigration politics" (1995) , which posits that the costs and benefits of immigration will influence the kind of politics and policies that emerge. Groups including agricultural growers or the construction industry have a vested interest in a continued supply of immigrant workers.
Moreover, when costs rise during economic decline, or when immigration costs are concentrated to certain geographic areas, the salience of immigration rises and the mode of politics is transformed into more raucous "interest-group" competition that has come to define immigration politics in the contemporary western world. In this sense, the state is an arena where groups compete with the aim of enacting policy. This framework of politics as an economic calculus found support among neo-Marxist scholars of immigration policy, including Korpi's (1980) power resources theory, where emphasis is placed on organized working class parties working against the disproportionate power of the capitalist class. More powerful employers are better positioned to maximize their resources in order to expand a "reserve army of labor." (Boswell 2007; Hollifield 2000) The capitalist class is also prone to divide labor along ethnic lines by using immigration to diversify the labor pool (Marx and Engels 1962) . Restriction, then, is seen as tied to proletariat successes.
Empirical tests of this theory have shown that decreasing wages (Goldin 1994; Foreman-Peck 1992; Lowell et al 1986; Timmer and Williamson 1998) and rising unemployment (Meyers 2000) are associated with policies aimed at reducing immigration. These political economy accounts of immigration policy show several weaknesses, including the inability to explain noneconomic or economically irrational policy positions (Haus 2002; Meyers 2000; Watts 2002 ).
Based on these critiques, some of the most important work on interest-group competition has relied on the expansion of power resources theory, breaking from purely materialist determinants to include Weberian constructs of "status groups." Advanced by Stephens and Huber (2001) and described as "power constellations" theory, the inclusion of status groups accounts for non-class bases of organization, such as gender, race, ethnicity, or religion. These status groups are crucial because they are not reducible to their market positions (Freeman 2011) and they "typically divide the constituency of class-based organizations." (Huber and Stephens 2001:19) Class cleavages and major cross-alliances that result are not easy to predict and often lead to contradictory policies (Hollifield 2000; Janoski and Wang 2005) . Pro-immigrant groups consist not just of business associations typically on the political right such as agricultural growers or software firms interested in labor, but also groups on the left such as liberal churches, ethnic lobbies, human rights groups, and others (Freeman and Tendler 2012; Freeman and Hill 2006; Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Hollifield 2000; Tichenor and Harris 2002) . While breaking from the materialist approach has advanced the theoretical underpinnings of the power constellations framework, few quantitative examinations of state-level immigration policy have explicitly focused on non-material drivers of legislation.
State Compacts and Immigration Policy
Research examining the "Utah solution" found that the Utah Compact, adopted a few months prior, strongly influenced the development of these laws (authors 2016; Stewart and Jameson 2013). As Stewart and Jameson (2013:15) are very diverse, and we review some of their key similarities and differences below.
Operationalization of State Immigration Legislation
One key source of diversity is the numerous ways in which immigration policy has been operationalized. Some scholars look at the predictors of specific policies (Creek and Yoder 2012; Newman et al 2012) . Other analysis has taken a broader approach, analyzing all immigration laws passed at the state level over a specified period of time. For this approach, the majority of researchers have relied on the National Council of State Legislature's (NCSL) data, which provides information an all immigration laws passed at the state level starting in 2005.
Using this database, several researchers have created ratios measuring the inclusivity or exclusivity of state policies. This ratio measure ranges from -1 to 1 measures based on exclusivity or inclusivity of state laws (Boushey and Leudtkke 2011; Chavez and Provine 2009) to more complex ratios that then scale state laws in order to take into consideration the degree to which large numbers of immigrants are impacted (Monogan 2013) .
Predicting State Immigration Legislation
Within the emergent literature on state immigration policies, several primary variables have been tested as predictors of inclusive or exclusive immigration laws. Although results have been somewhat inconsistent, the most frequently significant predictors of state policies include:
(1) the state's economic situation, (2) the rate of growth of the foreign-born population, (3) state politics, and (4) the role of interest-groups. We briefly discuss each below. 
Data and methods

Dependent Variable-Immigration Legislation
In this paper, we operationalize immigration legislation in two ways. First, we employ the immigration policy scale developed by Monogan (2013 In addition to compacts and interest groups, we include as control variables a number of independent variables that have been found to be significant predictors of state policy in previous studies. These include measures of economic health and immigrant threat and measures of ideology (see Table 1 We also include a time-varying categorical measure of party control, in which Republican control of both legislative chambers and the governorship is the reference group and is contrasted with total Democratic control and split control. Data on party control of state legislatures and governorships comes from NCSL.
<<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>>
Statistical model
Previous studies of predictors of state policy have taken a variety of methodological approaches. Some studies attempt to explain the overall restrictive or inclusive nature of state policies, without taking the timing of specific legislation into consideration (Chavez and Provine 2009; Monogan 2013) . Others have used longitudinal data structures in order to predict the likelihood of specific policies in specific years (Creek and Yoder 2012; Newman et al 2012) .
Because previous research on the Utah Compact indicates that the Compact, which passed in 2010, had a direct impact on the type of legislation passed afterwards, we elect to use longitudinal models in this research as well.
We use a multilevel, random-effects, regression approach in analyzing the data, with years (Level 1 observations) nested within the 50 U.S. states (Level 2). In the models using a dichotomous dependent variable (whether the state passed any inclusive immigration law), we employ a logistic transformation. The scale value of immigration policy passed in state s in year t (Lst) can be summarized:
In this notation, s denotes individual states, and t denotes time (years). β0 represents an intercept.
Z1 is a vector of Level 1 variables (including whether the state passed a compact) and Z2 is a vector of Level 2 variables (including dominant religion). u is an error term. All of our data analyses are done using the xt set of commands in Stata 14 (StataCorp 2015).
Results
Bivariate results
Bivariate statistics, shown in States that pass compacts have similar sizes of foreign-born population and political contributions from construction, but, importantly, have much higher political contributions from agriculture. The averages presented in Table 2 mask substantial heterogeneity across states that adopted immigration compacts. Figure 1 , using Colorado and Indiana as examples, shows the heterogeneity in the relationship between compacts and immigration policy scale scores. In the figure, solid lines show immigration policy score trends in years before a compact was adopted, while the dotted lines show trends after the adoption of a compact. Immigration policy scores increased dramatically in the year after Colorado adopted its immigration compact, while immigration policy in Indiana was actually more inclusive in the years before it adopted an immigration compact. Colorado has a larger Catholic population than does Indiana, as well as a history of higher campaign contributions from agriculture. These interest groups may explain the apparently greater effectiveness of Colorado's immigration compact.
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Multivariate results
We cannot fully understand the relationship between interest groups, immigration compacts, and immigration policy without considering the impacts of other demographic, economic, and political factors. In this section, Table 3 shows the results of the multilevel regression predicting the immigration policy scale score, and Table 4 <<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>> Table 3 shows that the effect of passing a compact on immigration policy score is consistently negative. The effect never achieves statistical significance, probably due to the fairly small number of state-years that follow passage of a Compact, but given that our data represent the entire population of U.S. states, even non-significant effects are worth noting. Model 1 (Table 3) Table 2 ), but they pass exclusionary policies in spite of these characteristics.
Adding in the effects of demographic and economic characteristics (Model 3, Table 3) shows that immigrant population growth is negatively associated with inclusive immigration policy, while the proportion college educated has a positive effect, as expected. These factors have little influence on the effects of compacts, although they do diminish the effects of the proportion Catholics in the population. Finally, adding in measures of party control and ideology (Model 4, Table 4 ) has some influence on the negative effect of compacts, but the coefficient remains strongly negative.
<<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE>>
The results presented in Table 3 demonstrate that immigration compacts are actually associated with more exclusive immigration policy scores. Even in the presence of relatively strong agricultural interest groups, states that pass compacts also pass exclusionary immigration policies, quite in opposition to the intentions of the compacts.
To provide an alternative, and potentially "easier" test of the effect of compacts, we estimate models with a dichotomous variable for passing any inclusive immigration law as the dependent variable. The results of these models are presented in Table 4 . In all four models presented in Table 4 , the association between adopting an immigration compact and passing an inclusive law is in the expected direction, with adopting a compact associated with higher odds of passing an inclusive law. However, the association is never statistically significant. The relationship between interest groups and inclusive immigration policies are somewhat different than those presented in Table 3 . All interest groups tested, with the exception of campaign contributions from agriculture, are negatively associated with the odds of passing an inclusive immigration law (Models 1 and 2, Table 4 ). Controlling for interest groups appears to diminish the positive association between passing an immigration compact and passing inclusive laws (Model 2, Table 4 ). This likely indicates that the combination of agricultural contributions and immigration compacts in combination leads to more inclusive laws passed. Adding demographic and economic variables (Model 3, Table 4 ) or ideological variables (Model 4, Table 4 ) does not explain the relationship between compacts (or agricultural contributions) and passing inclusive immigration law.
Discussion and conclusions
The time of state immigration compacts appears to be over. et al (1992) and Wilcox et al (1991) note, religious groups often struggle to form a large coalition on account of doctrinal differences. Thus, it may be it is necessary for a single denomination to dominate a state and want immigration reform for inclusive immigration policy to be adopted. However, it is also possible that immigration compact movements gain the most momentum in states where the passage of harsh exclusionary laws is likely (as was the case in Utah) or has already occurred (as was the case in Arizona). If compacts serve to partially counteract the popularity or impact of exclusionary laws, we would expect this apparently paradoxical combination of positive effects on inclusive laws but negative effects on policy score.
The findings here make several contributions to the emerging literature on predictors of state policies. First, our study advances this research by incorporating two variables understudied in the literature to date-a state Compact on immigration and the role of the dominant religion in the state. Second, our study shows the importance of a better understanding of dynamics as they play out in influencing state immigration legislation. The study findings also show the need for inclusion of these variables to gain a fuller understanding of why states pass the immigration legislation they do. A fuller understanding of predictors may then help to anticipate the legislation that will be passed, and the impacts of this legislation on immigrants.
We believe this understanding is more critical now than it has ever been. As noted previously, with lack of movement by the federal government on immigration legislation, individual states are increasingly attempting, in very uneven ways, to deal with immigration.
State immigration policies can have significant consequences on immigrants. Thus, understanding state immigration policies and what factors determine these policies is increasingly topical and critical, both for contributing to the emerging literature on state immigration policies and to understanding on the ground consequences of these policies.
Our findings also point to four areas for future research. First, our findings point to an important role of religious composition as a predictor of immigration policy. The literature on Utah points to an important role of the LDS Church as an interest group lobbying for specific immigration policies. Our findings do not indicate that other religious organizations are likely to play quite so decisive a role. Nevertheless, the percentages of Catholics and Evangelicals in a state were at least as predictive of policy outcomes as other interest group measures that are more commonly used in policy research. Second, the importance of religion as an institution, and the heterogeneous effects of immigration compacts across states, both point to a need to focus on state institutions as a means of understanding state policy. Cross-national research has indicated that institutional settings are of great importance when it comes to immigration policy differences (Sainsbury 2012) , and state-level institutional arrangements have been linked to differences in other policy fields (Howard 1999 
